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That's Funny, You Don't Look Like You
Control the Government: The Sixth
Circuit's Narrative on Jewish Power
by
STEVEN LUBET*
Legal scholars have come to understand the importance of narra-
tives in influencing our understanding of the forces that shape our
lives. Personal accounts can illuminate comers of the world where
legal analysis provides little or no help.' The stories that individuals
choose to tell can also reveal their deeper motives and beliefs. Con-
sider what the three following narratives tell us about the speakers:
Brother, I don't care who sits in the seat at the White House. You
can believe that the Jews control that seat that they sit in from be-
hind the scenes. They control the finance, and not only that, they
influence the policy-making.
But [Jews] are also most influential in newspaper, magazine, print
media and electronic media.
It is obvious... that the prevailing mindset at [a division of the
United States Justice Department] was that the office must try to
please and maintain very close relationships with various [Jewish]
interest groups because their continued existence depended upon it.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. I am grateful to my research assis-
tant, Beth Anisman, and my student editor, Marc Rubinstein, for their thoughful assist-
ance. I am also grateful for support from the Chester and Edna M. Gould Fund of the
Northwestern University School of Law.
1. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WmLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 44-51
(1991); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,
87 MICH. L. REv. 2411 (1989); Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other
Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Educa-
tion, 88 N.W. U. L. REv. 695 (1993); Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. Rtv. 2320 (1989). But see Daniel A. Farber &
Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 807 (1993)(questioning the value of storytelling as legal scholarship).
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The language of these narratives embodies the venerable myth of
surreptitious Jewish control over government. 2 The message con-
veyed by these contemporary quotations should make us realize, in a
way that reasoned argument may not, that the idea of a secret Jewish
ruling cabal, so popular in Tsarist Russia and Weimar Germany, has
not disappeared. Confronted by the actual narrative, we cannot ig-
nore the fact that the damaging fiction of Jewish control lives on in the
minds of a surprising number of Americans. Of course, it is no revela-
tion to hear these beliefs expressed by someone with known anti-Jew-
ish sentiments. And, indeed, the first two quotations come from a
recent speech by Khalid Abdul Mohammad, a spokesman for Louis
Farrakhan's Nation of Islam.3
It should shock us, however, to realize that the third comment is
taken from an opinion of the United States Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals.4
While the court's story of covert Jewish influence is more re-
strained than Mr. Mohammad's, the charges are uncomfortably simi-
lar. Mr. Mohammad makes the sweeping claim that Jews control
finance, the media, and even the White House. The Sixth Circuit's
point is merely that Jewish groups were able to dictate the "mindset"
of certain federal prosecutors. Differentiated by tone and scope, but
similar in implication, both assertions ultimately rest on the notion
that Jews are able, through stealth or pressure, to exert unjustified
sway over governmental bodies.
It is, after all, not a particularly far distance from "Jews control
the Federal Reserve" 5 to "Jewish interest groups dominated an arm of
the Justice Department." The three-judge panel may not have in-
tended to broadcast an ethnic slur, but their opinion inescapably gives
2. See, e.g., GERALD REILLINGER, THE FINAL SOLUTION 3 (1987) (explaining
Hitler's fixation on the power of an imagined "conspiracy of world Jewry" capable of
harming Germany through its control of international finance and domination of govern-
ments). Perhaps the most famous American exponent of the Jewish power theory was
Father Charles Coughlin, whose radio programs in the 1930s regularly denounced "interna-
tional Jewry" as responsible for events ranging from the Bolshevik revolution to the Amer-
ican Civil War. See NATHAN BELTH, A PROMISE TO KEEP 130-39 (1979).
3. The quoted remarks come from a speech given by Mr. Mohammad at Kean Col-
lege in Union, New Jersey on November 29, 1993. Excerpts from that speech were printed
in a full page advertisement in the New York Times paid for by the Anti-Defamation
League. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1994, at A27. For a news story reporting details of Mr. Mo-
hammad's speech and reactions to it, see Jon Nordheimer, Divided by a Diatribe; College
Speech Ignites Furor Over Race, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1993, at B1.
4. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 355 (6th Cir. 1993).
5. Another theory of Mr. Mohammad's. See supra note 3.
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official recognition to anti-Jewish stereotypes in a way that has proba-
bly not been seen in this country since the last century.6
The Demjanjuk Case
The appearance of an anti-Jewish stereotype would be unfortu-
nate in any judicial opinion. But it is most distressing, indeed almost
alarming, that the Sixth Circuit utilized this narrative of Jewish power
as part of its justification for the order vacating the extradition of John
Demjanjuk following his acquittal in Israel on charges that he was
"Ivan the Terrible," chief executioner at the Treblinka death camp.7
The legal basis for the vacatur of Demjanjuk's extradition order
was prosecutorial misconduct. The court found that the Justice De-
partment's Office of Special Investigations (OSI) had wrongly with-
held certain evidence from the defense.8 My purpose here is not to
criticize this decision on the merits, although it is highly suspect on
purely legal grounds.9 Perhaps the Sixth Circuit added a page or two
6. On December 17, 1862, General Ulysses S. Grant issued the infamous General
Order Number 11, expelling all Jews from the military department comprising parts of
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi then under the control of the Union Army:
The Jews, as a class violating every regulation of trade established by the Treasury
Department and also Department orders, are hereby expelled from the Depart-
ment... [w]ithin twenty-four hours from the receipt of this order.
Paul Finkelman, Civil Liberties and Civil War: The Great Emancipator as Civil Libertarian,
91 MICH. L. REv. 1353, 1357 n.35 (1993) (quoting from 7 THE PAPERS OF ULYSSES S.
GRANT, DECEMBER 9, 1862 - MARCH 31, 1863, at 50 (John Simon ed., 1979)).
Grant explained his order to an assistant secretary of war by using a variant on the
Jewish power story: "The Jews seem to be a privileged class that can travel everywhere
.... " The order was subsequently revoked at the insistence of President Lincoln. Grant
himself made a partial retraction during the presidential campaign of 1868. Grant, Ulysses
Simpson, 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 855 (1972).
Regarding anti-Jewish pronouncements, it has been said that "[n]o single act or word,
let alone edict, of another president or federal official, in all of American history, compares
with the Grant order for rank generalization, harshness, or physical consequences." Id.
Although the Sixth Circuit's Demjanjuk opinion led to no harsh physical conse-
quences, it does compete with General Order Number 11 in the category of rank
generalization.
7. Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 342.
8. Id. at 352.
9. Those who are interested in the legal aspects of the decision might note that the
withheld evidence was largely insubstantial and mostly inadmissible; nearly all of it, and
more, was eventually supplied to Demjanjuk's lawyers in Israel; the prosecutors clearly
complied with what they believed to be the standard for the production of evidence in
extradition cases; the court imposed a new rule for the provision of evidence that, if fol-
lowed, will severely burden future extradition cases involving terrorists and ordinary
criminals; the opinion redefined "fraud on the court" to include unintentional conduct; and
all of this was done in order to reach a decision that was moot by any criterion. See
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, Report of Special Master Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr. (June 30,
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of gratuitous criticism, directed at what they characterized as pressure
from Jewish groups on the OSI, in order to bolster an otherwise ques-
tionable legal opinion. In any event, this Essay will examine only the
particular section of the opinion that deals with claims of Jewish influ-
ence on the OSI.10
The issue of Jewish influence was first raised by Demjanjuk's law-
yers, who claimed that exculpatory evidence was ignored and con-
cealed by prosecutors in response to pressure from members of
Congress, the State of Israel, and various Jewish influence groups. In
other words, Jewish leverage led the OSI to blindside the Demjanjuk
defense. The Special Master appointed to investigate the case, federal
Judge Thomas A. Wiseman of Nashville, categorically rejected these
charges. Specifically, Judge Wiseman found that there was "no sub-
stantial evidence that [pressure] played any role in the decisions
whether, and how, to prosecute Mr. Demjanjuk."'11
Sadly, the Sixth Circuit disregarded the findings of its own Special
Master and proceeded to dignify this charge of furtive Jewish control.
In what can at best be described as a naive affirmation of a classically
1993) [hereinafter Report of Special Master]. Regarding mootness, see Steven Lubet, Dis-
turbing Echoes in U.S. Court Opinions, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 10, 1994, at 17.
10. That section reads:
Although the Special Master found that pressures from outside OSI did not
influence the respondents' failure to disclose required information, the presence
of such pressure cannot be gainsaid. In August of L978 Congressman Eilberg, the
Chairman of an important committee, wrote then Attorney General Bell a letter
insisting that Demjanjuk be prosecuted hard because "we cannot afford the risk
of losing" the case. The trial attorney then in charge of the case, Mr. Parker,
wrote in his 1980 memorandum that the denaturalization case could not be dis-
missed because of factors "largely political and obviously considerable." Other
lawyers in OSI wrote memos discussing this case as a political "hot potato" that if
lost "will raise political problems for us all including the Attorney General." Mr.
Ryan, Director of the office, wrote the Assistant Attorney General of the Crimi-
nal Division in 1980 that OSI had "secured the support in Congress, Jewish com-
munity organizations, public at large for OSI-press coverage has been
substantially favorable and support from Jewish organizations is now secure," but
he went on to say that "this support can't be taken for granted and must be rein-
forced at every opportunity." Mr. Ryan also testified that "in 1986, which was the
year before the [Israeli] trial [of Demjanjuk], I went to Israel for about 10 days on
a lecture tour that was sponsored by the Anti-Defamation League .... It is
obvious from the record that the prevailing mindset at OSI was that the office
must try to please and maintain very close relationships with various interest
groups because their continued existence depended upon it.
Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 354-55 (citations omitted).
11. Report of Special Master, supra note 9, at 27-28.
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anti-Semitic theory, the court commented dryly that the existence of
such pressure could not be "gainsaid.' 12
The opinion then gathered and listed scattered references to Jew-
ish organizations that were culled from OSI files, even though only a
few of these files made direct reference to Demjanjuk.13 Following
this catalogue, the court concluded that the Demjanjuk prosecutors
(including Allan Ryan, then the director of the OSI) had been af-
fected by their determination "to please and maintain very close rela-
tionships with various interest groups .... ",14 It takes no great act of
deduction to determine which interest groups the court had in mind,
since the same paragraph of the opinion makes repeated mention of
"Jewish organizations," including the Anti-Defamation League.
The logical retort, one supposes, would be to let the shoe fit.
There were indeed contacts between Jewish organizations and the
OSI, and some information was not provided to Demjanjuk. The
court drew its conclusions; you can draw yours. The logic of the retort
falls apart, however, when one carefully examines the three types of
pressure identified by the court.
Tales of Jewish Pressure
The Demjanjuk court first quoted a letter from Congressman
Joshua Eilberg, referred to as the "Chairman of an important commit-
tee," to the then Attorney General Griffin Bell.' 5 The court charac-
terized this letter as insisting "that Demjanjuk be prosecuted hard"
and cited it as evidence that the OSI had been pressured into a "win at
any cost" posture.16
In fact, Eilberg's letter said nothing of the sort. Rather, the con-
gressman expressed his concern that the Demjanjuk case was not be-
ing prepared properly and that it might be lost due to inadequate
prosecution.' 7 He urged the Attorney General to place it in the hands
of the "Special Litigation Unit (the predecessor of the OSI), so as not
to risk losing the case."' 8 Eilberg, at the time of his letter to Bell, was
the chair of the House Subcommittee on Immigration.' 9 His letter
12. Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 354.
13. Id. at 354-55.
14. Id. at 355.
15. Id. at 354.
16. Id. at 355.
17. Id. at 354 & n.4.
18. Id. at 354 n.4.
19. Eilberg was not the Chair of the House Committee on the Judiciary. Whether his
Subcommittee on Immigration was "important" is a matter of interpretation; it would be
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concerned nothing more than the resolution of a turf battle between
the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the United States At-
torney's Office in Cleveland, a matter that was squarely within his
subcommittee's purview. There is no objective way to read this letter
and conclude, as the court did, that it might possibly affect the motives
of Demjanjuk's prosecutors, although that implication certainly lends
more credence to a theory of pressure-induced misconduct.
In addition, Eilberg was defeated for reelection in 1978 and was
out of Congress by the time the alleged misconduct occurred.20 It
strains credulity to think that the misconduct referred to by the court
could have been in reaction to pressure from a person who no longer
had any power to affect the prosecutors in any conceivable way.
Given the court's ominous understanding of Eilberg's letter, we can
only wonder how many communications the Attorney General re-
ceives each week from members of Congress which amount to pres-
sure that "cannot be gainsaid."
It is noteworthy that Demjanjuk also had his champions in the
House of Representatives. For example, Ohio Congressman James
Traficant accompanied Demjanjuk on the airplane that brought him
back from Israel to Cleveland.21 Traficant repeatedly petitioned the
Justice Department on Demjanjuk's behalf, and he recently called on
Attorney General Janet Reno to appoint a special prosecutor to inves-
tigate the Justice Department and the OSI.22 Following the Sixth Cir-
cuit's reasoning in Demjanjuk, one would have to conclude that
Traficant exerted improper pressure. The more reasonable judgment,
however, is that the congressman was only doing his job as he saw fit.
The Sixth Circuit's selective criticism of contact between members of
Congress and governmental agencies demonstrates the flaw in the
court's reasoning. There must be a single rule for all Representatives,
whether their names are Traficant or Eilberg.
It should be obvious that "calls" from congressional members are
a routine part of the Attorney General's life. Most are no doubt made
equally fair to refer to it as a minor subcommittee, and some might even call it obscure.
The Sixth Circuit's choice to emphasize the subcommittee's significance is a good example
of the way that the opinion repeatedly plays on the theme of Jewish power to support its
conclusions.
20. Richard L. Lyons, Democrats Retain the House, but GOP Begins a Comeback,
WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1978, at A15.
21. Edward Walsh, Protests Greet Demjanjuk's Return After Seven Years, WASH.
POST, Sept. 23, 1993, at A3.
22. Michael Isikoff, Appellate Panel Rebukes Justice Dept. on Demjanjuk, WASH.
POST, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al, A37; Bill Sloat, Demjanjuk Remains Subject to Expulsion,
CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 18, 1993, at lA.
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more for constituent value than in any hope of actually influencing the
Department of Justice. And if such calls do have a marginal impact
on official decision making, does that really matter? Elected officials
are supposed to represent the views of their constituents and commu-
nicate them to the executive.
For example, following the acquittal in California state court of
the Los Angeles police officers charged with beating Rodney King,
the Congressional Black Caucus joined in the demand for a federal
civil rights prosecution233 Eventually, such a case was brought, and
officers Koon and Powell were convicted.2 4 Their conviction was re-
viewed and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.25 The
court considered the defendants' double jeopardy claims, but rejected
them with no mention of the calls for federal prosecution from Repre-
sentatives Waxman and Waters.26 In other words, the Ninth Circuit
decided the case on its merits; "power stories" were irrelevant.
The letter from Joshua Eilberg, then, would ordinarily be viewed
as mundane, signifying nothing more than the congressman's interest
in the progress of the case. It takes on a more sinister cast only if one
is bent on telling a tale about the presumed sway of interest groups.
The same can be said of the second type of pressure that the Sixth
Circuit noted as affecting the prosecution of Demjanjuk. The court
assembled five or six allusions to "political problems" and "Jewish or-
ganizations" that were found in various OSI files. Though presented
23. Bob Dart, Dormant Civil Rights Probe Reopened, Federal Agents Pursue Criminal
Investigation, ATLANTA CONST., May 1, 1992, at B3 ("Meanwhile, members of the Con-
gressional Black Caucus urged the Justice Department to quickly put the four Los Angeles
policemen on trial. 'We're not asking for an assessment; we're asking them to prosecute,'
said Rep. Maxine Waters (D-Calif).").
President Bush also let his views be known. Elizabeth Neuffer, Bush Calls for Calm;
Rights Case Weighed, BOSTON GLOBE, May 1, 1992, at 1 ("Deploring the violence searing
Los Angeles, President Bush... pledged that the Justice Department will expedite its
investigation into possible civil rights violations in the beating of black motorist Rodney
King by white police officers.").
Following the convictions of Officers Koon and Powell, the Congressional Black Cau-
cus successfully urged the Justice Department to appeal the relatively lenient sentences.
Henry Weinstein, Justice Department to Appeal Powell, Koon Sentences, L.A. TiMES, Aug.
28, 1993, at Al ("But the Justice Department's action was lauded by Rep. Maxine Waters
(D-Calif.), who along with two dozen other members of the Congressional Black Caucus
publicly urged Atty. Gen. Janet Reno to appeal the sentences to the U.S. 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals.").
24. Don Lee and David Ferrell, 2 Officers Guilty, 2 Acquitted: Guarded Calm Follows
Verdicts in King Case, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 18, 1993, at Al.
25. United States v. Koon, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 22588, at *14041 (9th Cir. May 2,
1994).
26. Id.
in a single paragraph, the references actually occurred over a number
of years and in differing contexts.27 These references and allusions
can be made to seem meaningful only by virtue of ethnic innuendo.
The court's first set of quoted comments mentions the potential
"political problems" that would be raised if the Justice Department
were to lose the Demjanjuk case.28 The opinion's next sentence refers
to the importance of support from Jewish organizations,2 9 as though
there were a connection between the two observations, when in fact
there was none. The latter quote is lifted from a "management re-
view" memorandum listing the significant accomplishments of the
OSI; it had no relation to the handling of the Demjanjuk case.30 By
stacking these otherwise unconnected comments, the court makes it
appear that the appeasement of Jewish organizations played a
portentous role in the Justice Department's approach to the prosecu-
tion of Demjanjuk.
Perhaps most troubling of all is the court's third narrative of Jew-
ish influence, a visit to Israel by OSI director Allan Ryan. The court
observed that, in 1986, Ryan "went to Israel for about 10 days on a
lecture tour that was sponsored by the Antidefamation [sic] League
. It is clear that Ryan's Israel trip is intended as an example of
illegitimate Jewish leverage, especially since it was used as the lead-in
to the court's observation that the OSI was motivated by its reliance
on interest groups.32
What the court omitted was the fact that Ryan's lecture tour oc-
curred more than three years after he left the Justice Department.33
In fact, Ryan arrived in Israel more than five years after the alleged
withholding of evidence and a year after the initial order of extradi-
tion. The Anti-Defamation League's sponsorship of Ryan's tour
could not have influenced the Justice Department's prosecution of the
Demjanjuk case since it occurred long after that prosecution was com-
plete. The only true significance of Ryan's trip is that it provided the
Demjanjuk court with another Jewish angle in support of the decision
to vacate the extradition.
27. Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 354-355.
28. Id. at 354.
29. Id. at 354-55.
30. Report of Special Master, supra note 9, at 38.
31. Demjanjuk, 10 F.3d at 355.
32. Id.
33. See Allan Ryan, The Defense of a Prosecutor, HARV. CRIMSON, Dec. 6, 1993, at 2.
See also Abraham H. Foxman, Ruling on Demjanjuk Errs in Assumptions, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 1993, at A24 (letter to editor).
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So there it is, a letter from a defeated congressman, some con-
tacts with Jewish organizations, and a post-resignation trip to Israel
sponsored by the Anti-Defamation League: pressure so irresistible, so
un-gainsayable, that it contributed to misconduct by federal prosecu-
tors. These incidents can only be united by their Jewish theme, as it is
palpably absurd to suggest that they had any true potential to thwart
the course of justice. The federal prosecutors deny that they improp-
erly withheld evidence from the Demjanjuk defense; but it would have
been wrong if they did, without regard to whether Ryan went on a
lecture tour of Israel. But the real point is this: Who cares if Jewish
groups expressed their interest in the progress of a war crimes prose-
cution? That was democracy, not misconduct.
The Demjanjuk case is the only time that the Sixth Circuit has
ever reversed a judgment, criminal or civil, even partially on the basis
of interest group influence. In fact, over the years the Sixth Circuit's
opinions have made a number of references to the significance of in-
terest group involvement in public life.34 In a school desegregation
case, for example, the court noted with approval that a special master
had received input from "legitimately affected interest groups. ''35
Surely the Jewish interest groups mentioned in the Demianjuk opinion
had a valid concern with the conduct of war crimes prosecutions. It is
hard to understand how the court could be so shocked (shocked!) to
discover that prosecutors had communicated with community organi-
zations. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit compiled a list of ordinary
events and exaggerated their gravity in a way that demonstrates, at
the very least, an unconscious receptiveness to age-old images of clan-
destine Jewish influence and control. I have no reason to think that
the three judges consciously intended their opinion to be read this
way, but its implications are unmistakable. And that is how subtle
prejudice is often revealed. Innocent, everyday conduct is suddenly
given a foreboding interpretation when the actors involved are
minorities.
34. See, e.g., Kelly v. Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co., 900 F.2d 89, 93 (6th Cir.
1989) (shipowners were among interest groups accommodated by Congress); Mathis v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1983) (interest groups prompted adoption of varying
statutes of limitations); Michigan Envtl. Resources Assoc. v. County of Macomb, 1989 WL
54116 (6th Cir. May 23, 1989) (unpublished) (environmental interest group participation in
Michigan's Solid Waste Management Committee). But see United States v. Michigan, 940
F.2d 143, 164 (6th Cir. 1991) (disapproving intervention of interest groups as "litigating
amicus curiae").
35. Reed v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 740 (6th Cir. 1979). Interestingly,
the Reed opinion was written by the same judge who wrote the Demjanjuk decision.
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Confronting Stereotypes
The Demjanjuk court's discussion of Jewish influence comprised
little more than a page of a much longer opinion. The body of the
decision was devoted to far more technical issues, such as the discov-
erability and materiality of evidence. Why make a tsimmis out of a
few throwaway references that are not even integral to the holding of
the case? Might it not do more harm than good to look for trouble
where no offense was meant? With all of the rabid anti-Semites in the
world, why seize on the words of a few well-meaning judges?
There is often a reluctance to confront certain ethnic stereotypes.
If the story avoids coarse language, it can seem hypersensitive, even
impolite, to point out low-grade affronts. In this case, the Sixth Cir-
cuit's "Jewish power" narrative not only refrains from crudity, it over-
laps considerably with simple recognition that American Jews have
achieved much affluence and prominence. On the other hand, even
innocuous forms of a myth can lead incrementally to more pernicious
versions: Jews are "overrepresented" in the media, Jews dominate
banking, Jews run the international monetary system. These state-
ments are, of course, demonstrably untrue, but they are constructed
from bits and pieces of reality. Individual Jewish success stories are
embellished and expanded until they are eventually used as evidence
of pervasive, and usually negative, ethnic characteristics.
This phenomenon is well known, and it is hardly applied only to
Jews. Many white people, for example, often thoughtlessly refer to
African-Americans as natural athletes. That observation, of course, is
based on the real-life achievements of gifted men and women. But
even when intended as complimentary, such comments tend to belittle
the accomplishments of African-Americans in fields such as science,
commerce, law, and the arts.
Group characterization often devolves into slurs and worse. Sto-
ries that take form from mere indignities have a way of leading to
rank discrimination. For example, it was offensive when Jimmy "The
Greek" Snyder said, on national television, that Blacks make out-
standing athletes because they were bred for strength during slavery.3 6
But, at least in the professional sports world, the story was not limited
to demeaning cliches. Earlier, Al Campanis, a vice-president of the
Los Angeles Dodgers, revealed the level of bias faced by African-
American candidates for front office jobs in sports when he voiced the
36. 'Greek' Fired Over Racial Slurs, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 18, 1988, (Sports), at 8.
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theory that Blacks "lack the necessities" to be named to managerial
positions.37 Insults thus become inseparable from their consequences.
Federal courts have the power to turn stereotypes into national
policies. Perhaps the most well-known example was the case of Myra
Bradwell, 38 in which the United States Supreme Court held that Illi-
nois could prohibit women from practicing law, owing to their "pecu-
liar characteristics, destiny and mission... . -39 In the words of Justice
Bradley, in concurrence, "[t]he natural and proper timidity and deli-
cacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of
the occupations of civil life."'4 The widespread acceptance of this
story of feminine weakness helped create many enduring legal disabil-
ities, some now abolished, some persisting.
The story of Jewish power in the Demjanjuk opinion is not part of
the court's holding, so it does not have any direct legal consequences.
It does, however, cast a pall on Jewish participation in public life, at
least within the Sixth Circuit. What is the lesson when government
officials are chastised for their contacts with Jewish organizations?
How will future prosecutors react when they are approached with
concerns over war crimes or anti-Semitic violence in the United
States? The rummaging through lawyers' fies for evidence of minor-
ity group influence suggests that all prosecutors should be wary of
community outreach, lest some court find that their "mind-sets" were
corrupted by pressure.
Thus, the Demjanjuk opinion takes us down a familiar road.
Blacks are physical, women are soft, and Jews are devious. In each
case, and in many more, it is a predictable, albeit irrational, step from
tacit acceptance of the stereotype to overt prejudice and intolerance.
Resentment of imagined "Jewish power" has fueled all manner of
truly anti-Semitic incidents, from the lynching of Leo Frank 4' to the
German atrocities on Kristallnacht.42 In the contemporary United
37. Leonard Koppett, Baseball's Racial Hypocrisy, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 14, 1987, at
A31.
38. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
39. Id. at 142.
40. Id. at 141.
41. In 1915 Leo Frank was lynched in Cobb County, Georgia. His murder by an an-
gry mob was one of the most overt displays of anti-semitic violence in the history of the
United States. See Leo Frank's Belated Pardon, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 24, 1986,
at 7.
42. On the night of November 9, 1938, the Nazis set in motion their first nationwide
assault on Jewish lives and property in Germany. The "night of the broken glass" resulted
in dozens of murders and the imprisonment of tens of thousands of Jews in concentratior
camps. See SIMON WIESENT L, EVERYDAY REMEMBRANcE DAY 250 (1987).
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States we see its reflection in the conspiracy theories of Khalid Abdul
Mohammad and David Duke. If Jews are reputed to have too much
power, disproportionate power, or special influence, it becomes that
much easier to fault them for economic collapse or whatever other
social ills that are at the top of one's own agenda.
Unlike the vicious language used by Mr. Mohammad, the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in the Demjanjuk case would probably not hit the
top on any scale of disparaging characterizations of Jews. The opin-
ion, however, is more significant for its source than for its choice of
language. Polite stereotypes can be as damaging as rude ones. Fed-
eral judges speak with well-deserved authority, and, in this case, they
have added an unfortunate measure of credibility to an ethnic story-
a dishonorable myth-that has no business in any judicial opinion,
much less one that deals so intimately with the Holocaust.
